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1.

Introduction
Kuznets (1966) defines economic growth as a sustained increase

in both income per capita and population size.

The role of population

is central not only in the operational or empirical approach of Kuznets,
but also in the neoclassical theory of growth identified with Solow
(1958).

Phelps (1961, 1966) established the golden rule of capital

accumulation and dedteed the condition for optimality that the net
marginal product of eapital per-capita not be less than the rate of
growth in population.

Diamond (1965) provided a microeconomic founda

tion for aggregate capital accumulation in the context of an overlapping
generations model from which the identical condition for optimality
appeared to result.

However,

unlike

Kuznetsis view, economic

growth theory has not been concerned ~ith population as an outcome of
the process of economic development.
This paper analyzes the equilibria of a competitive
economy within an overlapping generations growth model in which fertility
is subject to choice at the level of the individual.

The model is a

straightforward extension of the Samuelson (1958) - Diamond (1965) frame
work, except that agents are assumed to enjoy parenthood,and offspring
are assuned to consume resources before reaching adulthood
Willis, 1973)•

(Becker, 1960,

We first investigate the steady state of this economy and
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compare its characteristics to those of an equivalent social planner problem.
Then, in subsequent sections, we characterize possible associations between
fertility (the rate of population growth) and income per-capita over
the equilibriUJll time series path of a particular economy and in the_
cross-section, i.e., at the steady states of different economies.

The

results demonstrate the flexibility of the model in generating associations
between population growth and income per-capita that fit the stylized facts
(e.g., see Kuznets).
Samuelson (1975) has discussed exogenously given steady state
optimal population growth in Diamond's overlapping generations growth
model.

Unfortunately, Deardorff (1976) showed that if the production

function is unbounded, there does not exist a finite stationary capital
labor ratio or a positive rate of population growth that solve Samuelson's
planner problem.

Razin and Ben-Zion (1975) considered a model of

population growth where the representative agent has an infinite horizon
time separable utility function in consumption and "newly born people". 1
Therefore, the long run allocation is similar to that of the social
planner allocation in Samuelson and in this paper as well.

By including

fertility in the utility function, Razin and Ben-Zion partially avoided
the indeterminacy problem of Samuelson. 2
In this paper, each individual derives utility only from own
consumption and from own children.

1

We show that the allocation of the

The motivation for this specification of preferences is that parents
care about the utility of their offspring.

21n the planner problem the budget constraint
is not convex. Hence, there
may not exist an interior maximum or a unique solution, even when
fertility enters the utility function directly (See Razin and Ben-Zion
footnote 12).
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social planner in this framework is not characterized by minimizing
population growth; given reasonable assumptions about preferences,
fertility occurs as an interior solution of the planner problem.
Furthermore, as in the case where fertility is exogenous, the competitive
equilibrium converges either to the Golden Rule or to a stationary path
where the net marginal product of capital per-capita exceeds the rate of
population growth.

In this regard, results with endogenous population

growth are not dissimilar to those from conventional competitive growth
models.

Moreover, the planner allocation always satisfies the Golden

Rule as in the Diamond model.

In contrast to the case with exogenous

fertility, we prove that even when a paper asset is privately valued,
in which case the economy is on the Golden Rule, the competitive allocation
is not the same as the planner allocation.

Indeed, the competitive

allocation is characterized by fewer children and more savings than is the
planner allocation.

Intuitively, this follows from the fact that

each agent can obtain the same rate of return on the paper asset regardless
of the desired quantity of uwu children, and thus without incurring the
expense of having own children.

Given this, we also demonstrate that a

voluntary social security program, in which the size of the transfer to
a particular agent is directly tied to own fertility, leads to the planner
allocation.

3

3

Willis (1980) conjectured that such a program would induce this
equivalence, arguing by analogy from a model of the extended family
in which old age security is tied to own fertility.
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In the next section, we present a growth model with endogenous
fertility.

We describe the economy and define the competitive equilibrium.

In section 3 we present the problem of the social planner and compare the
stationary competitive and planner allocations.

In section 4 we demonstrate

the propositions of the previous section with an example and provide a
brief discussion of optimality issues.

In the following section, we

explore the positive aspects of the model.

The final section

summarizes and highlights areas for future research.
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2.

A Growth Model with Endogenous Fertility
The economy to be studied is a variant of the Samuelson (1958) -

Diamond (1965) overlapping generations growth model.

In this section we

describe the technology, the preferences and the characteristics of the
decentralized economy.
The technology is represented by a constant return to scale aggregate

production function, F(K, L) where K is capital and Lis labor, such that
K
1 ,

f(k) = F(

1), f(O) = 0, f'(O) =~,where

The single good

can be either consumed or stored as capital for next period production.

o in storage and production.

We assume that capital depreciates at rate

Time is discrete and individuals live for three periods; infants, who make
no decisions in the first period, working ("young") in the second period,
and retired ("old") in the third period.

In the second period individuals

supply one unit of labor and they decide on their lifetime
consumption and savings.

We assume_that individuals enjoy parenthood and

they decide about the quantity of own children in the second period of their
life.

Each child born at time

t

consumes

e

units of the single good.

The representative individuals life-time utility function is
(2.1)
where

Ci(t)

i + 1

of his/her life,

is the consumption of a member of generation
i = 1, 2, and

children of each member of generation

1 + n(t + 1)
t.

t

at .period

is the number of

The utility function (2.1)

satisfies the usual concavity and differentiability conditions with
respect to all variables,as well as the following conditions:
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(i)

(ii)

as

where

.

V

av

i = · aci

Condition

(i)

Condition

(ii)

'

ensures that

i = 1, 2

c1 or

v

and

c2

~

n

3

=

E -

1

t=l

av

4
less than one.

consists of a given number, N(O), of old

Each initial old person is endowed with

K(l)

, H > 0 , units of a paper asset.
N(t)

1

a(l+n)

people and a given number, N(l), of young people, with N(O)

there are

< £ <

states that the marginal utility of children becomes unbounded

The economy at date

=Nlto)

O

never optimally zero.

is

as the number of children approaches some number

h(O)

with

and

N(l) > 0 •

units of capital and
Since all people are alike

= (1 + n(t)) N(t-1) young people at each period t

>

1.

Before we discu~s specific market structures, we characterize the

set of feasible and optimal allocations of this economy.

4
We ignore the discrete nature of fertility.

In addition, this

condition is crucial in establishing the existenc~ of an interior solution
to the planner
E

problem discussed below.

must be greater than

Deardorff (1976).

In particular, we will show that

1 - o to avoid the existence problem noted by

7

Definition
An allocation

{c (t), c (t-1), n(t+l), K(t+l)}
1
2

for all

t > 1

is feasible if it satisfies

c1 (t)

(2.2)

where

c 2 (t-1)

+ l+n(t)

+ (1 + n(t+l))e = f(k(t)) + (1-o)k(t) - (l+n(t+l))k(t+l)

is per-worker capital.

k

A stationary allocation is defined

such that the variables in (2.2) are independent of the time index

t.

Definition
A feasible allocation

{c1 (t),

c2 (t-1),

"n(t+l), k(t+l)}

for all t > 1

is optimal if and only if there does not exist another feasible allocation

{c (t), c (t-1), n(t+l), k(t+l)}
1

2

for all

t > 1

such that

and
(b)

>

with at least one strict inequality.
This optimality definition maximizes the welfare of the
representative consumer of each generation and ignores the size of the
population in the welfare criterion.

If

n(t) > n(t)

fo~ some

t, the

economy with a larger population size would have an inefficient allocation.
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Hence, the optima l alloc ation ," - ", has less people , and some
agents
are, trivia lly, worse -off since they don't exist.
alloca tions will be Pareto non-co mpara ble.

Usuall y the two

We view this implic ation as

an impor tant drawba ck to the above defini tion of optim ality when
popula tion
size is subjec t to choice .

However, this defini tion follow s the

conve ntiona l approa ch (see Koopmans, 1965 ), and we adopt it
even
though it permi ts
becaus e there are

a partic ular alloca tion to be ineffi cient only
~

many childr en.

In some of our analys is we focus on statio nary alloca tions and
thus neglec t all genera tions prior to the steady state.

For the steady

state, an optim ality defini tion would consis t of condi tion (a)
above as a
strict inequ ality for genera tions that are at the statio nary
alloca tion.
This optim ality defini tion is identi cal to a socia l planne r proble
m
that we formu late and analyz e in the next sectio n.

The Decen tralize d Economy
In this sectio n we descri be the equili brium of the compe titive
marke t when popula tion is subjec t to choice .
saves
h(t)

K(t+l)

units of the good for his produ ction at time

t+l.

He holds

units of the paper asset whose price in terms of the consum ption
good

at time
unit

Each young of genera tion t

of

t

is

P(t).

labor

goods at time

t.

At time

t

the indivi dual suppli es exactl y one

and receiv es a wage of
At time

t+l

W(t)

in terms of consum ption

each old person hires

labor for produ ction using his accum ulated capita l

L(t+l) units of

K(t+l ), and consumes

his capita l rent and the non-d epreci ated quant ity of capita l.
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Formally the problem of a young person of generation t
at time

t-1 is to maximize, for all

t ~

who is born

1,

(2.3)

subject to

(2.4)

c1 {t)

= W{t) - K(t+l)- P{t) h(t) - e(l + n(t+l))

(2.5)

c2 {t)

= F(K(t+l), L(t+l)) - W(t+l) L(t+l)
+ (1 - o) K(t+l) + P(t+l) h(t)

by choice of

c1 (t), c2 (t),

K(t+l), h(t), n(t+l) and L(t+l).

The first order necessary conditions for a maximum are

<

s:

<
=

(2.9)

if K(t+l)

>

0

with =

if h ( t) .

>

0

with=

if n(t+l) > -1

with=

if L(t+l)

0

v 2 [F 2 {K(t+l), L(t+l)) - W(t+l))]
Observe that

O with=

<

0

>

0

(2.9) implies that the real wage is equal to the

marginal product of labor,and that,if

K(t+l),

h(t)

and

P(t)

are positive,

the net rate of return on capital is equal to that on the paper asset.
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Definition
A perfect-foresight competitive equilibrium consists of non-negative
values of

W(t), h(t+l), k(t+l), P(t), h(t)

and

L(t+l)

for all t

~

1,

that are consistent with the necessary conditions for the maximum problem
of the young (2.3) and
(i)
(ii)
(iii)

N(t+l) • (l+n(t+l)) N(t) is the law of motion for population
L(t) N(t-1) = N(t)

is the equilibrium demand and supply of labor

N(t) h(t) = H is the equilibrium demand and supply of the paper asset.

A monetary equolibrium (ME) satisfies the above definition with

P(t) > 0

for all

t

~

above definition with

1.

A

non-monetary equilibrium (NME) satisfies the

P(t) = 0

for all

5

t > 1.

Hence, in a NME condition

(iii) is not necessary.

A stationary equilibrium (SE) satisfies the above definition where we
ignore the index

t

on all variables besides

we require that P(t) h(t) • g

for all

equilibrium (SME) is a SE where

g

equilibrium (SNME) is a SE where

5

1f

P(T) >

0

for some T >

>

g •

0

t > 1.

P(t), h(t)

an<l

N(t)

Then a stationary monetary

and a stationary non-monetary

0.

1, then

P(t)

and

> 0

for any

t <

T.

I
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Observe that in SE,

c

, Ci and n are unchang ed for each member of each
1
Then, the first order necessa ry conditio ns for SE with k,

g~nerat ion.

li-n > · 0 can be written as

(2.10)
with • - if

(2.11)

g

> 0 •

(2.12)
f(k) - k f'(k) - W• 0

(2.13)

Let the supercr ipt
variable s

"c" correspo nd to the '\'alues of the real stationa ry

W, k, n,

Furtherm ore let
respect ively.

"-c"

c2

and

...

and

c1

for the competi tive solution of (2.10) - (2.13}.

"c" correspo nd to the SME and the SNME,

Observe that for·SME we require that (2.11) holds in

equality .

It is evident that in SME conditio ns (i) and (iii) in the
definiti on of competi tive equilibr ium together with g • P(t) h(t)

imply that

P(t+l)
-c
P(t) • 1 + n •

Hence, (2.10) and (2.11) imply that for the

SME the economy is on the Golden Rule· such that

-

C

(2.14)

f' (k ) -= ~
ri
and

(2.15)

.

+

6
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As such we show that similar to the case where fertility is exogenous,
the competitive monetary equilibrium may converge to the Golden
Rule where the net marginal product of capital per-capita is equal
to the rate of population growth.
converge

In addition,a non-monetary equilibrium

may

to a stationary path where the net 111Srginal product of capital

per-capita exceeds the rate of population growth.

Hence, the endogeneity

of population growth does not alter these characteristics of competitive
growth models.
Having described the structure of the model, two areas of analysis
may be explored.

One a~enue is the Social Planner solution to the

allocation problel!-1 in this economy and the comparison to the decentralized
economy. A second area of analysis is to explore
model.

the positive features of the

In particular, empirical regularities with respect to economic

growth, population growth, and per-capita income across countries and
over time should be explicable in the context of the model.
these issues in turn.

We discuss
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3.

The Social Planner and the Competitive Allocation
It is the tradition in growth models to compare the Social Planner

solution to that of the competitive equilibrium.

In growth 1110dels of the Cass

Koopmans type in which agents are assumed to be infinitely lived, there is a
In models where agents

straightforward equivalence between the two allocations.

have finite horizons but the economy exists.forever, there always exists the
problem of welfare tradeoffs across members of different generations.
Therefore, unlike the Cass-Koopmans model, here it is not clear what
Furthermore,

we should consider as the problem of the Social Planner.
there is no equivalence between Pareto

optimality in this model (see

definition in section 2) and the particular Social Planner problem that
ve discuss in this section.

6

Here we follow Diamond (1965) and Samuelson

(1975) who characterize the planner problem as a choice between
stationary allocations where each aenber of each generation has an
identical utility level.
Samuelson (197~) solved for the stationary planner allocation of the
economy described in section 2 ignoring the fertility choice, i.e., maximizing
(2.1) with respect to

c1 , c2

and

k

excluding the third argument of- (2.1),

subject to (2.2) at the stationary allocation with

e •

o.

Given this

allocation, Samuelson then described the necessary conditions for choosing
the level of fertility that maximized the utility of the representative agent on
the stationary path.

Samuelson denoted that stationary allocation the Golden

Golden Rule of population growth and capital accumulation.

6

Deardorff (1976)

Although the planner allocation is Pareto optimal, it does not necessarily
characterize all optimal allocations.
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pointed out that if

f(k)

is ·unbounded, as is the case for a Cobb-Douglas

technology, the necessary conditions may correspond to a minimum welfare
level.

The fact that there always exists a large

solution is easily seen by setting n =
(e

=

-o

k

that dominates an interior

in the steady state version of (2.2)

O), for then the consumption possibility frontier can be expanded indefinitely

in the steady state with larger and larger levels of savings.

Thus, the

conclusion of the Solow model that population growth should be as small as
possible

J!lay not be different in the Diamond model, contrary to Samuelson's

conjecture.
The rationale for including fertility as part of the individual choice

calculus as is done here is based on the view that optimal fertility can only be a
meaningful concept where there exists a mechanism to achieve such a goal.
Notice that in (2.2), setting

n(t+l) • -G (e

unbounded consumption possibilities frontier.

rl

O) also leads to an

It must therefore be the case

that the marginal utility of children becomes infinite at a level of
larger than

-o,

which given condition

V(·) in section 2 implies that

E >

(ii) in the specification of

1 - ~.

The maximization problem for the social planner may be written
as follows:

n

15

maximize

(3.1)

V(C ,
1

c2 ,

1 + n)

subject to
(3.2)

C = W - T -(1 + n)k - e(l + n)

(3. 3)

c2

1

= (1

k

+ n) f(k) - (17 n)(W - T) + (1 + n)(l - o)k
>

0,

n > -1

Notice that (3.2) and (3.3) together are a particular decomposition of the feasibili
condition (2.2) at the stationary allocation.
labor and

W may be considered a wage payment to

T a lump-sum transfer between generations.

We employ this

decomposition in order to facilitate comparisons between the planner's solution
and the decentralized economy solution as it is deGcr~bcd in section 2.

In the

framework as written, for given W the transfer (T) may be either negative (a tax on
the old) or positive (a subsidy to the old).
modification of the planner's problem in which
particular

Later, we will consider a
T > 0

is imposed for a

W; otherwise W - T could be replaced ly a sinr,le variable or

we could combine

(3.2)

and (3.3)

into a single constraint, the

feasibility constraint given by (2.2) at the steady state.
Now, for any

W > O a planner

stationary allocation (PSA) satisfies

the following first order necessary conditions of problem (3.1), where we
assume interior solutions for

av
ak

( 3.4)

=

k, T and n.

..

0

( 3. 5)

(3 .6)

-

av

an

z::

=

0
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Given our assumptions about the utility function, it is easy to impose sufficient
conditions to

e.nsure that the interior solution to (3.4) - (3.6) corresponds

to a maximum.

Below we analyze the case of Cobb-Douglas utility and production

functions with full depreciatio n

(6 • 1)

and show the necessary and

7
sufficient conditions for the existence of an interior solution.
In the Diamond framework it has been established that if the stationary
competitive equilibrium is on the Golden Rule (monetary equilibrium ) then
this equilibrium is identical to the planner allocation.

To see that, recall

that the Diamond model is identical to that of this paper if fertility is
not a choice,

n(t)

=n

and

e

= O.

Then, (3.4) and (3.5) are identical

to (2.14) and (2.15) where the latter corresponds to all the necessary
conditions that satisfy the stationary monetary equilibrit111 given that
fertility is exogenous.
endogenous.

This result does not follow when fertility is

Proposition 1 below establishes that the competitive Golden

Rule is not identical to the social planner Golden Rule allocation.
Proposition 1:

The Stationary Monetary Equilibrium (SME) is not the

Planner Stationary Allocation (PSA).

7

As such,the problem that Deardorff mentioned can be easily eliminated
in this model by as&UfflPtions on the utility and the production functions.
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Proof:

To prove the above proposition we demonstrate that the S}!E is not

the same as the PSA by comparing the first order necessary conditions at the
stationary allocation for problems (2.3) and(3.l).
economy is on the golden rule.

Here the competitive

Hence, equations (2.10) and (2.11) are

identical to (3.4) and (3.5), respectively.
S"HE a 11 ocation we get· wP -- f (-:-ck) -

Evaluating the PSA using the

(nc + u1:)-:-ck •

Then,

(3.3) and (2.4) and (2.5) at the stationary state.

T

-c

= g

from (3.2),

Divide (3.6) by

':":'C

v1 and

using (2.10)- (2.13) we.get that the SME and the PSA are identical if and only if

-i<

+

__i:__ +

-f(°i<)+(;-c+ o)~ + f(~) + (1-o)'i<

l+nc

1

This contradicts ~ > 0

+ nc

-c

=

0, that is

__g__ =

0

.

1~

for the SME, and at this allocation equation

(3.6) is equal to

(3.7)

~
3

-~

0 ,

1

where the inequality holds since the first two terms sum to zero from (2.12).
Q.E.D.
0 bserve that there exists a "knife edge" case where
my

-c
g

= 0 such that the ecor

is on the Golden Rule and the stationary non-monetary equilibrium (SNME) and the

PSA are the same. Furthermore, at the SME the transfer (T ) of the planner is positive,
and in the absence of endogenous fertility the PSA and the SME are identical.
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In our model, the SNME is characterized by
f'(kp) = nP+ 6

characterizes the PSA.

solution as the

PSA.

result.

f'(kc)

>

~

"'c

n + 6, (gc = 0), while

Thus, the SNME does not have the same

,·Observe that the Diamond framework exhibits the same

Furthermore, if we impose on the planner problem that

and the transfer

T

'"'c
WP • W

is not permitted to be negative, i.e., no tax on the

old, (3.5) may hold as strict inequality and then

T•

o.

The relationship

between the SNME and the PSA is summarized by the following proposition.
Proposition

2:

If a

SNME

negativity constraint on
Proof:

At the SNME

"'c

g

T

=

exists, it satisfies the

and

_ _J)

PSA

subject to a non-

"'c

w- • W •

0 •

at the

PSA

and

observe that

T • O, since the constraint~ (3. 2) and (3. 3) are satisfied

at the SN11E.

From (2.10) and (2.11) we get that

1 + ~c

Then conditions (3.4) and (3.5) are satisfied.8 Divide (3.6) by

"'c
V

1

we get

e = 0 •

Hence, the SNME satisfies ·(3.4)

8condition

(3.6) and is equivalent to the PSA.

(3.5) is statisfied as an inequality since T • O.

Q.E.D.
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Notice that the constraint that the transfer
affect Proposition 1.

T be positive does not

Moreover, we have not demonstrated that the planner's

solution with the restriction that

T

>

0 implies satisfaction of the

optimality criterion that would take into account the welfare of generations
that are not on the stationary path.

Thus, Proposition 2 does not i11ply

that the SNME is optimal.
Propositions 1 and 2 imply that under certain restrictions on the
social planner, that allocation and the stationary competitive equilibrium
differ only when the Golden Rule is satisfied.

The monetary

equilibrium is characterized by positive transfers across generations while
in the non-monetary economy there i s ~ direct trade between different
generations besides that which arises from the existence of the labor market.
It is interesting to note that the labor market which also connects the
different generations does not imply any divergence between the planner and
the competitive markets.

Next we suggest an intervention policy in the asset

market which supports a decentralized equilibrium that is identical to the
planner at the steady state.

Additionally, we show that fertility in the

competitive economy (SHE) is higher than the social planner's optimum
fertility level.
An Intervention Policy
The potential non-optimality of competitive markets in overlapping
generations models, the over-accumulation of capital, serves as a justi
fication for a social security program (Samuelson, 1958), as an explanation

20

for valued fiat money issued by the government (Wallace , 1980) and as a
justific ation for a welfare improvin g role of nationa l debt (Diamond, 1965).
All of these suggeste d programs remove the ineffici ency of the competi tive
allocati on by introduc ing a costless feasible mechanism that transfer s goods
across generati ons ~ith a rate of return that is equal to the market rate,
i.e., the populati on growth rate.

Here, we have abstract ed from the standard type

of ineffici ency by introduc ing a paper asset that is identica l to fiat money.
Furtherm ore, when fertilit y is subject to choice, as we have already shown,
the equivale nce of planner and competi tive allocati ons cannot be achieved
by introduc ing a fixed stock of fiat money or a pay-as-y ou-go social security
program .

In fact, the program must tie the return on the saving- transfer

decision to the chosen fertilit y rate,

n.

Conside r a voluntar y self-fin ancing social security program
adminis tered by the govemm ent that promises a return on savings during
the working period that is identic al to the individu al specific fertilit y
rate,

n.

It is straight forward to verify that this program will give

rise to a SE that is identica l to the PSA.

To see this, rewrite (2.4) and

(2.5) as

(3 • 8) Cl ( t)

=

H( t) - K(t + 1) - g ( t) - e ( 1 + n ( t + 1) )

c (t)

=

F(K(t+l ), L(t+l)) - H(t+l)L (t+l) + (1-6)K( t+l) + (l+n(t+ l)) g(t)

(3. 9)

2
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where

g(t)

now represents the voluntary contribution to the social security

program by each of the young of generation
generation

t.

A young person of

maximizes (2.3) subject to (3. 8) and (3. 9).

t

The first-

order necessary conditions for SE are
-V

1 + V2 [f' (k) + 1 - 6] "' 0

(3 • ll)

<

0

(3 • 12)

=

0

(3. 13)

f (k) - kf' (k) - W =

O

with=

if

0

Note that the SME now differs from the PSA if and only if (3.12) differs from
(3.6) given that {3.13) is satisfied.

However, substituting the solution

to (3.10)- (3.13) into (3.6) with T • g , we get
V,,_ - V, (e
~

+

k) ~ V,.,(8

~

+

k(l -cS)

~

+ f'(k))

=

which is i<lentical to (3.12).

Thus, the social security program induces

an equivalence between the SME and the PSA.
An alternative policy would be to place a tax or subsidy on children
financed by a lump-sum transfer between generations.
would be replaced by

e

+

T

where

T

Thus

e

in (3 .8)

is the per child tax or subsidy

and the right hand side of (3. 9) would be augmented by

T (1

+

2
n) •

Such
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a program would be identical in impact to the social security program
previousl y discussed as can be seen by setting

g(t) =

important differenc e, however, is that the optimal

T

T(l + n).

An

would need to be

known by the planner since such a program would not be voluntary .

We have demonstra ted that the SME is not identical to the planner
solution and we have proposed a social security program that induces these
allocatio ns to be the same.

The following propositi on asserts that the

SME is character ized by too few children and too much savings.

Hence, our

suggested program will increase fertility and reduce capital accumulat ion.
Propositi on 3:

If the utility function is such that second order

condition s for the PSA hold globally, then

the SHE has

a lower stationar y rate of populatio n growth than the PSA.
Proof:

See Appendix A.

The fact that t~e PSA has a higher stationar y stock of capital
per-capit a, i.e.,

kp

<re, is immediate from the golden rule condition

that holds for both allocatio ns.

This result is due to the fact that the

planner takes into considera tion the direct effect of the fertility rate
on the rate of interest while each young takes the rate of return on savings
parametr ically.

As such the planner perceives a benefit from populatio n

growth that has no counterpa rt in the competiti ve economy.
In the following section we consider the popular example of a log
additive utility function and a Cobb-Douglas productio n function in order
to show analytica lly the results of this section.
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4.

An

Example
In this section we analyze the monetary and non-monetar y equilibria

and the planner

problem for the case of a log additive utility function and

Cobb-Dougla s production function.

In this example the stationary equilibria

of monetary and non-monetar y economies arise immediately , that is, after only
one period.

We provide analytical solutions for the stationary competitive

and planner allocations which can be used to demonstrate the validity of the
proposition s of the previous section.
The utility function is given by
(4.1)

V •

and the production function by

(4.2)

f(k)

•

Aka

•

Proceeding as in Section 2, assuming for convenience full depreciatio n
of capital (6 • 1), the first order necessary conditions for the
maximizatio n problem of the decentraliz ed economy are

(4.3)

(4.4)

(4.5)

P(t+l)

BJ
+ 1 + n(t+l)

-

<

0

0

24

For a monetary equilibrium (ME) (4.4) is a strict equality while for
a NME it is a strict inequality.

Using (2.4) - (2.5) and (4.3) - (4.5),

it can be shown that the equilibrium paths for capital per capita and the
price of the paper asset must satisfy

a

(4.6)

k(t+l)

AB s(l- a)k(t) )
H
3
B
+ P(t) N(t)
(
2

•

s A(l - a)k(t)

The right hand side of (4.6) is merely the savings of generation

82
s -

Sl+B2+B3

t

with

the fixed marginal propensity to save from income (Wt)

which is equal to A(l - a)k(t)

0

•

The left hand side of (4.6) shows the

division of total savings between capital and the paper asset.
Setting P(t) • O in (4.6) yields the equilibriu~ level of capical
per capita for the NME fort~ 1, since k(l)

is given. -Thus,

(4. 7)

Solving for the equilibrium levels of fertility, and first and second
period consumption yields for

(4.8)

(4.9)

t !_ 1
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(4.10)

It is thus obvious that the SNME
k(t+l)

and

n(t+l)

is reached immediately since both

are independent of

For a monetary economy Pt

t, for all

is positive.

t > 1.

From inspection of
a N(t)

(4.6) it is readily seen that if P(t)

takes the form

a stationary value of

It is easy to show that there

exists a

k

is obtained.

yk(t)

H

y, which is only a function of the underlying parameters of the
9

model, such that the stationary equilibrium is obtained fort~ 1 •
t > 1

Without presenting the algebra, the solutions for

(4.11)

,

~(t+l)

•

8 ae
2

(4.12)

(4.13)

exist it is necessary that

8 - a(8 + 2S +
2
2
1

s3 )

>

0 •

are:
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(4.14)

where

k(l)

and

n(l)

are given as initial condition s.

Note that in the Diamond framework the same example gives rise to
a smooth path of infinitel y many periods of convergen ce to the steady state.
However, the endogenei ty of fertility enables the economy to restore the
steady state in one adjustmen t period.
The planner stationar y allocatio n for· this example can be obtained
by solving (3.4) - (J.6) together with the feasibili ty constrain t at the steady sta

c1

+

c2

ffi +

e(l + n) • f(k) - (1 + D)k , and is given by10

(4.15)

(4.16)

(4.17)

81

p

p

( S +S )(k + e)(l + n)
2 3

(4.18)

1

~ote that for a planner's solution to exist it is necessary that
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Given these solutions the propositi ons of section 3 are easily
demonstra ted.

Comparing (4.11) - (4.14) to (4.15) - (4.18), it is readily seen

that the stationar y monetary equilibriu m is not the same as the planner
allocatio n (Proposit ion 1).

Furtqer, the number of children is less in

the monetary equilibriu m, i.e.,

1 +

;c <

1 + np, as stated in Propositi on 3.

To see that it is only necessary to show that ~ > kp

since the golden rule

holds in both cases, i.e., (4.12) and (4.16) are the same.

The differenc e

between ~ (4.12) and kp (4.15) is positive if

This is true if

B2 - a(B 1 + 26 + a )
3
2

> 0, which as noted is the

condition for a monetary equilibriu m to exist.

As observed in the

previous section, the two allocatio ns differ because the return
on the paper asset is not perceived by economic agents in c01J1petitive
equilibriu m as being related to their own fertility choice.

Any single

individua l does not take into account the impact of an additiona l child
on the rate of return to the paper asset from which all of the old benefit.
The demonstra tion of Propositi on 2 is also straightfo rward.

Basically ,

it must be shown that the SNME satisfies (3.6), where it is recognize d that
T • 0 at the SNME and W is set at the competiti ve wage. Now (3.6) with
V and

f(k)

given by (4.1) and (4.2) is equal to

which upon substitut ing for the SNME as given by (4.7) - (4.10) reduce to zero.
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Proposition 2, which states that the SNME will be equivalent to the
planner allocation if the planner is restricted to pay the competitive
wage and not permitted to tax the old, is thus seen to hold if it is also
recognized that under these restrictions the golden rule is not a
necessary condition for the planner problem.
In order to complete the comparison between the planner and the
competitive allocation it would be of interest to investigate whether the
planner allocation is Pareto Superior to the competitive allocation using
the optimality definition in section 2.

If the planner allocation dominates

the competitive allocation then the competitive equilibrium is obviously
non-optimal.

However, if the planner allocation does not dominate the

competitive allocation i.e., if in the example of this section the initial
old and/or the first generation are worse off in the PSA, then it might
reasonably be conjectured that the competitive equilibrium is Pareto optimal.

11

We have neither been able to find a numerical example of planner
dominance nor a proof that the allocations are non-comparable.

11
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5.

Fertility and Economic Growth
In this section we consider the extent to which the implications

of the overlapping generations growth model with endogenous fertility as
previously presented conforms to cross-country and times series observations
on fertility and economic growth.
steady state

We show,using examples, that in the

fertility and income per-capita may be negatively related

even though children are normal goods and there is no child quality
component,(Becker and Lewis, 1973).

Competitive equilibrium conditions alone

are sufficient to generate this result.

We further show that in order to

generate declining fertility with increasing per-capita income along the
equilibrium path as recently observed for developed countries, additional
assumptions are required.

In particular, an extended model is presented in

which the cost of children is made a function of the wage rate (endogenous)
incorporating therefore a time cost to rearing children (Becker, 1960,
Willis, 1973~ Razin and Ben-Zion, 1975).

Simulations of that model which

can replicate the observed phenomenon are presented.
Consider first the steady state relationship between fertility and
income per capita.

Assume that cross-country differences are best

approximated by steady state comparisons or that the paths to the steady
state are sufficiently smooth so as to have the same properties.

In the

case of a stationary monetary equilibrium, the golden rule condition given
by (2.14) must be satisfied.

It is immed~ate that, except for production

function differences (or (differences in

6), economies with high capital

per capita must have low fertility, and this results solely from the golden rule
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coMpetitive equilibrium condition.

For example, economies with a hi:>her

cost of children (e) will have fewer children and higher incor.?e per capita
even though, at the individual level savinr,s could he independent of e.
This is easily seen from (2.10) and (2.11) in which

p (t+l)
p (t)

is set

equal to some consta_nt that as far as the individual is concerned is
unrelated to the population growth rate.
solved for

k

_Then,

f'(k) =

p (t+l)
p (t)

can be

in terms of the given rate of return to the paper asset,

which for the individual is independent of the cost of children.

There is, thus,

an important distinction between partial and r,eneral equilibrium results in this
case.
In the stationary non-monetary equilibriun, the golden rule no longer
is satisfied, and it is, therefore, not clear how fertility will be related
to per-capita income in general.

For the log additive utility function, the

steady state solution for capital per capita and for fertility are given h;'
(4.7) and (4.8).

It is still true that

k

and

n

are inversely related

across economies differing only in the cost of children.

However, in constrast

to the SME, no general results emerge when preference parameters differ.
These results illustrate poten_tial explanations for cross-sectional
differenceS in

inco□ e

and fertility.

Interpretation of the time series

observations requires .at analysis of the non-steady state features of the
model.

It is not necessary to solve completely for the decentralized

equilibrium in order to derive s0111e basic results.

In particular,

if the utility function is contemporaneously separable, it is easy to see
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from (2.8) that fertility and first-period consumption nust move topether: 2
If first period consumption is normal, then fertility will also be positively
correlated with income per capita alonp, the equilibrium path.
path

k(t)

is predetermined at

t+l, higher levels of

Since on the

k(t)

and therefore

of per-capita income at

t

children were inferior.

Notice that this argument is applicable both to

could only produce lower levels of fertility if

monetary and non-monetary equilibrium paths.
since

In the steady state, however,

k(t) • k(t+l), income per capita is predetermined and this difference

between the steady state and the path is crucial. 19
A

simple extension of the model is to assume that raising children

requires time, and therefore, that the cost of children is a function of
the endogenously determined wage rate.

In order to consider a multi-period

path from any initial condition to a steady state, we assume an addilog
utility function of the form 14 .

The cost of children
where

e

is replaced in (2.4) and (2.5) by

e

0

+ e W(t),

1

is the fixed cost of a child as in previous sections and

the fraction of time required for each child.

e

1

is

We consider only the non

monetary equilibrium path •

1 t>ifferentiating

1

(2.8),

3.rt

leisure is an argument in the utility function income would no longer
be predetenained.

14

Recall that the log additive utility function yields an i1a111ediate steady state.
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Table 1 reports several simulations of the model for alternative
values of

It turns out that the difference between

and

is important to the shapes of the equilibrium paths so that
varied in some of the simulations .
(e • 0)
1

goods cost of children

s2

one smaller than

for two values of

s3

of

and
k.

s3

is also

, one larger and

is larger than

cycle in the same direction, while in case B, where
n

and

The first two simulations assume only a

In case A where

•

s3

s3

s3

s2 ,

n

and

is less than

k

s2,

k move in the same direction which depends upon the initial value
In case

c,

propensity for n

e

is lowered and

0

and

e

1

, is raised and the

to move in opposite directions increases.

k

In this case capital per worker increases throughout the equilibrium path
while fertility first increases, reaches a piateau and then decreases until the
steady state is reached.

This example seems to be broadly consistent

with the observation s on fertility and economic growth as they are
15 In the final example, case D, there is only a time
summarized by Kuznets.
cost to raising children and in that case capital per capita rises and
fertility falls throughout.

These examples demonstrate that almost any

set of equilibrium paths of fertility and income per-capita, including
cycles, are consistent with a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium .
Hence, no general proposition s are feasible for this model.

15
Obviously some elements of the demographic transition are still missing
in this model, e.g. child mortality (Schultz, 1976), but can be
incorporate d in straightforw ard fashion.
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Given the time cost of children in this model, as capital accumulates
and the wage rate then rises, there is a substitution away from children
and towards goods consumption.

At the same time, as income per-capita grows,

the demand for children increases given the structure of preferences in
this example.

The path that actually arises depends upon the relative

strengths of these two effects which are directly related to the relative
magnitudes of the fixed goods cost and the time cost of raising children,
16
(Razin and Ben-Zion, 1975).
Having characterized the various alternative
equilibrium trends in a non-monetary economy, it does not seem that the
17
existence of a valued paper asset would alter the general results.

16
This can be shown for any separable utility function. Differentiating (2.8)
with e replaced by e + e W(t), and using (2.9), yields
1
0

d(ld~(~~c+l)) •

- k(t)!::k(t)) {el(l + n(t))Vl + (eO + el(l+n(t))W(t))Vll}•

The first term inside the brackets corresponds to the substitution effect
and the second to the income effect.
17
However, the monetary path is not easily solved.

Tnble

Non-Monetary Equilibrium

Path Simulations

Period (t)

Parameters

A.

eo

el

83

.9

0

.7

k (t)
l+n(t+l)

B.

c.

.3

.OS

0

.4

k (t)

•7

.15

1

. . . . . . .....

0

1

2

3

4

.001

4.51

1.06

1.35

1.29

1.30

.022

.· 4.86

2.02

2.33

2.28

2.28

.001

.618

l+n(t+l)

.016

k (t)

.001

2.84

.909
3.38

.055

.193

.930
3. '•2
.401

.931
3.42
.615

(:)()

.932
3.42
1. 35

w

w

l+n(t+l)

D.

0

.20

.7

k (t)
l+n (t+n)

~

1

=

B

2

=

.5

2.66

2.66

1.21
.001

.013

2.42

2.90

3.49

a

,= • 5

.079

A= 10

2.56
.272
2.05

2.47
.647
1.78

2.25
6.24
1.05

~
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6.

Concluding Remarks
When population is endogenously detemined within a neo-classical

growth model, there exists a stationary population growth rate that is
supported with stationary consumption per-capita.

This steady state may

or may not be on the Golden Rule; if it is on the Golden Rule, it does not
correspond to the social planner stationary allocation.

Moreover, the

social planner Golden Rule allocation is characterized by a higher population
growth rate and a lower level of capital per-capita in comparison to the
competitive Golden Rule allocation.
The competitive perfect-foresig ht equilibrium growth model
we have presented was shown to generate patterns of population and
income per-capita growth that are consistent with recent time-series
evidence on developed countries and with international cross-sectiona l
evidence.

An important, yet in our model omitted, ingredient to

population change, particularly in less developed countries,
is that of infant and child mortality.
~Au~~uuu~

If birth rates respond to

mo~~ali~y of children or if their mortality is itself part of

the household decision process, then the model as formulated does not
capture the complete story.

In particular, it has been argued that the

demographic transition from high fertility and high mortality environments
to

low fertility and low mortality environments is due in part to

(exogenous) permanent declines in mortality.

A natural extension of

our framework would include child mortality in the model in part t_o
ascertain whether the observed pattern in income per-capita, fertility
and mortality can be replicated.
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Given our conclusion

that the competitive stationary equilibrium has

fewer children than the planner allocation, one might wonder whether it is
possible in growth models with endogenous fertility to generate a competitive
equilibrium with "too many" children.

The main justification for the view

that the world is, in this sense, overpopulated seems to stem from the Malthusian
argument concerning fixed factors of production (land) which leads to
decreasing consumption per-capita with increasing population.

In fact, if

one includes in our model a fixed factor, then it is easy to demonstrate that
there does not exist a stationary allocation where capital per-capita is
18
constant, except when population is constant.
Hence, in a stationary
allocation, capital per-capita must grow to offset diminishing returns, i.e.,
it is required that there be land augmenting technical change, which is
feasible only if there is not a high rate of depreciation.

Most studies

assume an exogenous rate of land augmenting technical progress which is
equivalent to assuming growth without investment.

In particular, if there

is no capital in the model, it follows immediately that the competitive
equilibrium leads to the Malthustian prediction for consumption per-capita.
However, analyzing the optima and equilibria of economies with a fixed
factor of production as suggested above is beyond the scope of this paper.
This appears to us to be an important issue, although it is not clear that
our main results would be altered.

18

Let the constant returns to scale aggregate production function
be F(K(t), L(t), A), where A is fixed.

APPE!IDIX

A

In this appendix, we prove Proposition 3 in the text.
Proof of Proposition 3:
Although the SME is not optimal, its solution set does satisfy
(3 .4) and (3 .5).

However (3 .6)

evaluated at the SME is too large since

it reduces to
since

g >

0.

Moving from the SME to the PSA must leave (3.4) and (3.5) unchanged but
must reduce (3.6), where (3.4) - (3.5) are evaluated at the SME.
Thus, the following conditions, obtained by total differentiation
of the necessary conditions for the PSA, must hold.
(A.I)

dk +

a2v

a2v

akaT dT + akan dn

=

0

(A.2)

= 0

(A. 3)

<

where

2
a v
axay

0

is evaluated at the SME.

Solving

(A.l) and (A.2) for

dk

and

dT

in terms of

dn

substituting into (A.3) yields the following inequality eA"Pression,

and

A2

dn

(A.4)

where

IA I

=

I ~xay
av I

< 0

and where

is the <leterminant of the matrix

nd
obtained by deleting the 2~d row and 2
column.
conditions for the PSA hold at the SME, then
Thus,
n

and

dn
k

>

If the second-order

IA I

<

0

and

jA

22

1 >

O, i.e., the SME is characterized by too few children.

0.
Since

raust be inversely related, it must also be true that the SME

is characterized by too much savings.
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